Please note: This is an extract from Hansard only. Hansard extracts are reproduced with permission from the Parliament of Tasmania.
SECOND READING SPEECH
INTEGRITY COMMISSION BILL 2009
Mr Speaker I have great pleasure in bringing the Integrity Commission Bill 2009
before the House.
This Bill has its origins in one of the very first actions taken by David Bartlett
as Premier in May 2008 when he moved to establish a Joint Select Committee to
inquire into and report upon the issue of ethical conduct, standards and
integrity of elected Parliamentary representatives and servants of the State
in performing their duties.
The Select Committee was especially asked to look at whether current mechanisms
and arrangements were adequate or whether there was a need to supplement them
by establishing what was then being referred to as an Ethics Commission.
As a sign of good faith the Premier gave a commitment to implement the recommendations
of the Committee in relation to an ethics commission.
The Committee delivered its final report on 24 July 2009 which is almost nine
months later than originally intended. This was largely a testament to the complexity
of the issues confronting it, but I wont hide that it has been a significant
challenge to prepare such a major piece of legislation between July and now.
I would like to particularly thank the officers involved for all their hard
work. They have gone more than the extra mile to meet the Government, and indeed
the Parliaments commitment to the people of Tasmania to establish an Integrity
Commission.
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But Mr Speaker before turning to the Bill in detail I think it is important
to make some observations about our current mechanisms and arrangements.
It is the Governments view that there is already a strong accountability
framework in place in Tasmania and we included a lot of material to back up
this view in our submission to the Joint Select Committee.
This accountability framework is a mixture of legislation, guidelines and codes
starting with some of the more significant checks and balances which apply to
Members of Parliament and those who aspire to that office.
Conduct of Elections
The Electoral Act 2004 regulates many aspects of the conduct of candidates for
election to Parliament. These include sections dealing with:
o electoral bribery and treating;
o electoral intimidation;
o the requirement for campaign material to be authorised; and
o misleading and deceptive electoral material.
In addition to the laws covering State elections there are also specific rules
about the expenditure of candidates in Local Government elections.
Members of Parliament
Once elected, MPs are prevented by the Constitution Act from holding another
office of profit or holding a contract or agreement with the Crown.
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The Constitution Act also provides that a Members seat becomes vacant
if he or she fails to attend for a session without permission or is convicted
of a crime.
The Parliamentary (Disclosure of Interests) Act requires a Member of Parliament
to disclose certain interests and establishes a register of interests. Failure
to disclose an interest is punishable as contempt.
As Members will also be aware this House has a Code of Ethical Conduct and a
Code of Race Ethics in its Standing Orders. When members are being sworn in
after their election they are required to state that they have read and subscribed
to both codes.
The Code of Ethical Conduct deals with a range of issues including conflicts
of interest, gifts, using public property for personal gain and post separation
employment.
The Code of Race Ethics makes a number of commitments including respect of cultural
beliefs, valuing diversity, a commitment to Aboriginal reconciliation and a
duty to provide help without discrimination.
Quite appropriately there are more onerous conduct requirements applied to executive
government to Government Members and to the public service.
Ministers/Government Members
Government Members are subject to a Code of Conduct which sets out principles
to assist them in observing appropriate standards of conduct in public office
and to act as a benchmark against which that conduct can be measured.
Government Members and their immediate family are specifically required to make
declarations in relation to the
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giving and receiving of gifts and a register of these gifts is tabled annually
in Parliament.
Executive Government
Executive government is held accountable for its conduct through a number of
parliamentary mechanisms, most of them long standing.
These include:
o Question Time, which now takes place in both chambers and, in this House,
includes Ministers from the other Place. The latter, in particular, an initiative
of the Bartlett Government.
o And various Parliamentary Committees such as Budget Estimates Committees,
the Public Accounts Committee and the Public Works Committee
The Legislative Council, itself, is a standing body of review of the actions
and activities of executive government. Indeed, it has often been observed that
Tasmanias upper house is one of the most powerful chambers of its type
in the world.
Its particular strength derives from the fact that it cannot be dissolved so
there are never general elections. Each member holds office for a six year period
and there are periodic elections for either two or three of the 15 electorates
every year.
Ministerial Staff
The people who work in Ministerial offices work under a code of conduct which
requires them to:
o behave honestly and with integrity;
o act with care and diligence;
o treat everyone with respect and without harassment, victimisation or discrimination;
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o comply with the law;
o comply with lawful and reasonable directions;
o maintain confidentiality about dealings and information;
o disclose, and avoid conflicts of interest;
o use government resources properly;
o not knowingly provide false or misleading information;
o not make improper use of their position or of information gained in the course
of employment; and
o declare gifts received in the course of employment.
State Service
There is a statutory code of conduct for State Service employees. This code
has provided the model for the Ministerial Staff code so I wont go through
it in detail but in summary it requires that State Servants:
o behave apolitically and perform their functions in an impartial, ethical and
professional manner;
o behave in a way that does not adversely affect the integrity and good reputation
of the State Service;
o comply with the law;
o avoid and declare conflicts of interest; and
o use Tasmanian Government resources in a proper manner.
Under the State Service Act there are sanctions for breaching the Code which
go as far as dismissal in the most serious of cases.
State Service employment is also governed by the merit principle to avoid patronage,
favouritism and discrimination and ensure that anyone with the requisite skills
and qualifications can compete on an equal footing for government positions.
State Servants do business under a range of rules designed to ensure fair and
impartial decision making.
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There are many examples, but a good one is Treasurers Instruction 1101
which establishes a set of Procurement Ethical Standards and a Procurement Code
of Conduct. These are based on probity and fair dealing, value for money and
the avoidance of conflicts of interest.
Government bodies that deal with personal information about citizens are required
by the Personal Information Protection Act to observe strict safeguards about
the way that information is collected and used.
In addition, there is the Freedom of Information Act which underpins government
accountability through an obligation to release information about government
administration and decisions.
I wont go into FOI here in any detail as Members will be aware that the
Government has a Bill, the Right to Information Bill 2009, which makes major
enhancements in this area.
A further part of the existing accountability framework is the Public Interest
Disclosures Act. This Act provides protection for a person working inside the
system who brings wrongdoing to light. Again I am presenting a set of
reforms to enhance the effectiveness of this legislation in the current session
as part of the Premiers Ten Point Plan. That Bill is cognate with this
Integrity Commission Bill.
Mr Speaker I have been speaking so far about codes of conduct and the like but
there is another very powerful and long standing strand of accountability in
our system of government, in the form of independent statutory office holders.
Some of these officers such as the Ombudsman and the Auditor-General exist explicitly
to review and report on government actions.
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Others such as the Director of Public Prosecutions and the holders of judicial
office enjoy a high degree of independence partly to ensure that the rule of
law applies to executive government with the same force as to the rest of society.
This is a fundamental principle of our democracy.
There is not time now to go into all of the powers of the Ombudsman and Auditor-General
and in any case they should be well known to Members. I will also be speaking
more about them in the context of the new Integrity Commission and how it will
operate.
But in summary both officers operate with a high degree of independence and
have a reporting line direct to Parliament. Both have virtually unfettered access
to records and information held by government and can make their findings public.
Mr Speaker the Criminal Code of this State establishes a number of crimes that
apply specifically to the behaviour of Members of Parliament or those who may
seek to interfere with a Member of Parliament.
It also includes specific crimes that relate to the conduct and behaviour of
public servants and to those trying to influence the performance of a public
officers duties.
The Joint Select Committee on Ethical Conduct came to the view that some of
these provisions in the Code are ambiguous or at least that they are perceived
that way.
The Government has accepted the recommendation that these provisions be reviewed.
However this does not and will not change the fundamental principle that the
criminal law applies to all Tasmanians without regard for their position or
status.
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The judicial arm of government also acts as a check on executive government
in other ways such as the capacity for the Supreme Court to review decisions
of an administrative nature made under statute.
This was an important reform made in 2000 in the form of the Judicial Review
Act. It is a guard against improper conduct in the sense that the court can
look, amongst other things, at whether a decision maker has exercised a power:
o in bad faith; or
o at the direction of another person; or
o without regard to the merits of the case; or
o in a way that is an abuse of the power.
The related mechanism of review of specific decisions by the Administrative
Appeals Division of the Magistrates Court requires decision makers to give reasons
for their decisions. This requirement acts as an effective brake on the improper
exercise of executive power.
Mr Speaker I have attempted to demonstrate that there are already a great many
protections against impropriety in public life and this has been recognised
in the report of the Joint Select Committee itself.
No system is perfect however and it is just as clear that there has been a level
of community disquiet about the adequacy of these protections. As legislators
and as representatives of the community we serve we must respond to that sentiment.
Tasmania is not alone in this regard debates about accountability mechanisms
are a recurring feature of public life in all parts of Australia and no doubt
overseas.
I note for example that the Australian Law Reform Commission has a current reference
in relation to the conduct
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of Royal Commissions and that it has proposed a large number to changes to how
such Commissions are conducted.
The Discussion Paper that has come out of this ALRC reference has informed the
development of the current Bill.
Debate about these issues is a sign of an active democracy but it can also be
a sign of some loss of confidence in key institutions.
As Attorney-General and as Deputy Premier this is of great concern to me and
I believe that as Members of Parliament we all have a role to play in earning
public confidence and in maintaining the health of our political institutions.
We should all take care to see that our conduct promotes, rather than undermines,
confidence in our constitutional arrangements.
The Government has clearly set out its agenda for restoring community confidence
by means of the Premiers Ten Point Plan.
I am very pleased to say that nine of those ten matters have been completed
with the only one outstanding amendments to the Police Service Act
which is awaiting the completion of legal proceedings and is, in that respect,
out of the Governments hands.
The Codes of Conduct for Members and Ministers as well as Ministerial and Parliamentary
Member Staff, while already in place, will be, following its establishment,
referred to the Integrity Commission for review and to allow it to make recommendations
for improvement.
Mr Speaker having spent some time on the context, I now intend to deal with
the Integrity Commission Bill itself.
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At an estimated annual cost of $2.5m the establishment of an Integrity Commission
will be a major investment of public resources. Such investments should not
be made lightly and a lot of thought has gone into the policy basis for what
is being proposed.
I also note that this figure will increase according to the number of major
investigations and inquiries which the Commission actually undertakes. This
is because the Commission will need to pay for additional investigators, expert
advisers and legal and witness costs in such cases.
In its submission to the Joint Select Committee on Ethical Conduct the Government
developed a set of principles to underpin its model of an ethics commission.
Those principles were:
o recognition that prevention is as important as dealing with allegations of
unethical behaviour;
o the need to build on existing structures and mechanisms;
o the need for proportionality;
o a cautious approach to strong investigative or coercive powers;
o clarity and consistency about which public bodies are to be covered; and
o independence from the Government of the day.
Prevention
The Bill emphasises the Integrity Commissions prevention focus to be exercised
through:
o developing standards and codes of conduct for public officials;
o preparing guidance and training on matters of conduct, propriety and ethics;
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o providing advice on a confidential basis to individual public officials about
how these rules should be applied to specific instances.
The Commission will also be a source of advice to government on policy relating
to ethical conduct.
In keeping with this role the Government intends to refer some of the other
recommendations of the Select Committee to the Integrity Commission for advice
on their implementation.
Building on What Already Exists
The Bill recognises existing structures and mechanisms in two ways. The first
is the appointment of the Ombudsman, the Auditor-General and the State Service
Commissioner as ex officio members of the Commissions Board.
The Board will provide the strategic oversight for the work of the Commission.
The composition of the Board puts the Commission at the centre of our ethical
structures without displacing the skills and expertise of the Ombudsman, Auditor-General
and State Service Commissioner in their specific fields.
Just as importantly it means that the Commission will not be duplicating the
work of those officers the Integrity Commission is not intended to be
an open invitation to forum shoppers.
The Commission will assess the complaints it receives to see if there is a more
appropriate place for the matter to be handled. If there is, the complaint will
be sent to that body for action although the Commission may choose to maintain
a watching brief if the matter is of sufficient importance.
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This triage approach supports the Commissions charter to improve
standards of ethical conduct. Public sector bodies must be assisted, encouraged,
and if necessary forced, to address conduct issues as a normal part of how they
do business.
Washing their hands of responsibility for these issues wont be an option.
The related principle is that if there is another accountability body which
is equipped to deal with the matter it should be referred to that body and this
includes referring complaints to the Ombudsman, Auditor-General or State Service
Commissioner.
With few exceptions there are already processes and sanctions for dealing with
misconduct such as those that are set out in the State Service Act. These will
continue to operate.
The Integrity Commission can make and publish a finding of misconduct but it
cant impose a sanction for misconduct. That task will be left to the relevant
Principal Officer For example the General Manager of a Council in
the case of a council employee. These Principal Officers are listed in Schedule
1 of the Bill.
The Integrity Commission Bill does not create new sanctions or change the sanctions
that already exist in other legislation or in employment arrangements.
By the same token the Bill does not take away any appeal rights which currently
exist in relation to these sanctions but it adds a right of review where it
can be argued that an inquiry process has been procedurally flawed or has made
an error of law.
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In cases where the alleged misconduct could amount to criminality the Commission
will in most cases refer the matter to the Police who have the necessary skills
and resources to investigate criminal conduct.
It will also have the capacity to recommend to the Premier that a Commission
of Inquiry be established. Such cases will be extremely rare but may be the
appropriate response where something that starts off as an allegation of misconduct
but on closer investigation is more a reflection of systemic policy failure
than a case of unethical conduct by a particular individual or individuals.
It would not be expected for example that something like the recent Victorian
Bushfire Royal Commission would be conducted by the Integrity Commission if
it arose in Tasmania in the future: that would still be a proper subject for
a Commission of Inquiry held under the Commissions of Inquiry Act 1995.
Mr Speaker the Bill also recognises and strengthens Tasmanias existing
accountability framework by way of amendments to other Acts.
It establishes oversight of the Ombudsman and some functions of the State Service
Commissioner by a new parliamentary Standing Committee which I will be speaking
about a bit later.
The Bill also ties in the Integrity Commission with the enhancements that are
being made to the Public Interest Disclosures Act as part of the Premiers
Ten Point Plan so that the two Bills are being dealt with as cognate Bills.
The Integrity Commission Bill also amends the Commissions of Inquiry Act to
implement, and in fact go further than, a longstanding Law Reform Institute
recommendation. The Institute recommended that Commissions of Inquiry be able
to
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seek warrants for listening devices but the Bill extends this to the capacity
to seek a warrant to engage in audio and visual surveillance as well as tracking.
Proportionality
As I have explained in most cases alleged misconduct will be referred to another
body for action. To give a simple example, if a junior officer in a GBE makes
unauthorised use of the photocopier it technically amounts to inappropriate
use of public resources.
However to have the Integrity Commission investigate such a matter would be
a disproportionate response using a sledgehammer to crack a walnut -
when it would be preferable for the management of the GBE to take the necessary
corrective action.
Mr Speaker there are important exceptions to this rule. The Government takes
the view that there are certain categories of public official whose conduct
should be subject to direct scrutiny by the Integrity Commission.
In this Bill these officers include Members of Parliament, Local Government
councillors, CEOs such as heads of agency, members of the Senior Executive Service,
statutory office holders and police officers at or above the rank of inspector.
Because of the seniority of these officers there is a strong public interest
in the Integrity Commission running the investigation of any allegations against
these senior public officers.
The Bill doesnt give all investigations of police misconduct away to the
Integrity Commission - that would be overkill - but it recognises the special
place of police in the community by
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allowing the Commission to oversee or audit the way police investigate alleged
Police Service code of conduct violations.
This responds to concerns that have been expressed from time to time about the
undesirability of police officers investigating other police officers.
Where a police officer is suspected of having engaged in criminal conduct the
Integrity Commission may investigate the matter or maintain oversight of the
investigation by Police. This is to ensure not only that proper process is followed
but that it is seen to be followed.
The Police Association of Tasmania has raised issues about the differences between
how investigations work in this Bill and the procedures which apply in the Police
Service Act 2003.
I acknowledge that these differences exist, particularly in relation to the
power to compel a police officer to answer a question in Police Service Code
of Conduct matters, but this is not something which can be resolved simply in
terms of the Integrity Commission Bill.
I have discussed this with my colleague the Minister for Police who has agreed
to undertake a review of the Police Service Act 2003 to be completed no later
than the 30th of June 2010.
The Government feels this is a more appropriate and feasible means to examine
this issue, than to use the Integrity Commission Bill as a vehicle for substantive
reform of the Police Service Act.
For the information of Members who may not have done the comparison the Police
Service Act contains stronger powers in some respects than the Integrity Commission
Bill.
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In the case of Members of Parliament the Integrity Commission will not inquire
into matters that relate to the proceedings of Parliament itself. In this way
the Bill respects Parliaments prerogative to regulate its own procedures
through the presiding officers, privileges committees and so on.
As recommended by the Select Committee the Bill makes an important contribution
to the ethical supports for Members of Parliament by creating a Parliamentary
Standards Commissioner.
The Commissioners focus will be on providing confidential advice to Members
in relation to ethical conduct. They will also work with MPs, the Parliament
and the Integrity Commission to develop advisory material and training for Members
and their staff.
The Parliamentary Standards Commissioner will not be involved in the actual
investigation of misconduct allegations against MPs to avoid the potential for
conflicts of interest.
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Powers
There has been quite a debate within government about the powers that the Integrity
Commission should have. It is reasonable to be cautious about giving powers
to new bodies which will impact on the rights and liberties of individuals.
Members will note that a significant proportion of the Bill is devoted to the
procedural aspects of investigations and inquiries and that many of these provisions
relate to the need to provide procedural fairness while avoiding undue formality.
As a starting point for its powers the Commission clearly needs the same sort
of investigative powers as officers such as the Ombudsman. These include the
power to enter property, search for and seize material and to question witnesses.
The contentious area is whether the Commission should be able to compel witnesses
to answer questions and whether Commission staff should be able to engage in
surveillance as part of an investigation.
It comes down to a balancing act between the rights of individuals and the broader
public interest. In the Bill the Commissions investigators have the power
to direct a person to provide information or to answer a question unless a successful
claim of privilege can be made.
If the Commission establishes a Tribunal to enquire into a matter the Tribunal
will have the same directive powers.
A person subject to a direction to answer a question or produce material may
be excused from complying with this direction if they have a reasonable excuse.
For example, they may be physically unable to attend an interview due to illness
or they may wish to raise a matter of privilege.
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By privilege I mean privileges such as the privilege against self incrimination,
legal professional privilege, a range of privileges recognised in the Evidence
Act and also parliamentary privilege.
If the Integrity Commission does not accept a claim of privilege the person
claiming it can apply to the Supreme Court to have the privilege determined.
The Joint Select Committee recommended giving witnesses a right to silence and
I can see what they were trying to achieve with that. In the end though it may
put a person in a worse position if they are allowed to maintain their right
to silence but there is nothing to prevent an investigator or Tribunal from
drawing adverse inferences as a result.
I acknowledge that this is a difficult area and I look forward to Members
contributions on it.
Commission staff will only be able to engage in surveillance if a magistrate
can be satisfied that the necessary warrant should be issued.
These are very weighty powers and the clear expectation is that they will only
be used in cases where the gravity of the matter under investigation would justify
it.
The manner in which a warrant would be sought is intended to mirror the approach
taken in the Police Powers (Surveillance) Devices Act 2006.
Again the principle of proportionality must be considered when the Commission
and its staff make choices about when to call on the full extent of their powers.
In agreeing to these provisions, Parliament will be placing a high degree of
trust in the judgment of the people who will be able to make use of them.
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Coverage
I have already spoken about some of the public officials who will be subject
to the Commissions jurisdiction. In essence the Bill takes a very inclusive
approach with the result that pretty much all of what can be described as the
public sector is included.
The Government and the Select Committee are both of the view that Local Government
should be subject to the Integrity Commission Act and this is consistent with
similar bodies in other States.
Local Governments special features have been recognised in the composition
of the Integrity Commission Board which will include a person with experience
in Local Government to link the Commissions practices to existing conduct
arrangements for Local Government.
In summary then that the Commission will be able to deal with complaints about:
o a Member of Parliament;
o parliamentary staff;
o Ministers and their staff;
o State Service employees;
o Holders of senior executive office;
o Police;
o Local Government councillors;
o Local Government employees;
o Government House staff;
o GBEs and their employees;
o State owned companies and their employees;
o statutory authorities and their staff; and
o statutory officers and other government appointees;
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The Bill excludes the Governor, judicial officers and members of the Industrial
Commission and tribunals because of their adjudicative nature.
Independence
The Government recognises that the Integrity Commission must be able to operate
without interference from executive government.
The Commission is being established as a stand alone State Service agency in
the same way as the Tasmanian Audit Office. That allows it to prepare its own
budget bids and its CEO will not have to work through another head of agency
in relation to staffing matters.
The Integrity Commissions base budget will be developed through the normal
government budget process so that it is subject to the same level of scrutiny
and accountability as other public sector agencies.
However Members will note that at clause 86 of the Bill the costs of running
an Integrity Tribunal inquiry, including legal and witness expenses, are made
reserved by law items. These inquiries will not be cheap exercises and the Government
does not anticipate that they will be needed very often.
Nevertheless the Commission will be able to hold an inquiry when one is justified
without having to make a case to government for extra funds. We expect the Commission
will exercise this very unusual degree of financial independence responsibly
and with due regard to the public interest, including the public interest in
value for money.
The Chief Commissioner, the two independent community members and the member
of the Board with Local
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Government experience will be appointed by the Governor on the recommendation
of the Minister for Justice.
The person appointed as Chief Commissioner will be required to have at least
seven years experience as a lawyer and must also satisfy a statutory test of
political independence. The Chief Commissioner as a senior legal figure will
play an important role in maintaining the independence of the Commission.
Like a small number of other key Governor-in-Council appointments such as the
Electoral Commissioner, the Minister will be required to consult before making
a recommendation.
In this case the consultation will be with the new Joint Standing Committee
on Integrity. This Committee itself forms part of the protections for the Integrity
Commissions independence through oversight and reporting on the Commissions
activities.
The Government anticipates that the Joint Committee will maintain an active
dialogue with the Commission, its Board and CEO particularly in the establishment
phase. The Joint Committee will also have the task of formally reviewing the
Commission after three years of operation.
Mr Speaker I should emphasise that the Joint Committees role does not
extend to involvement in the conduct of specific investigations. In a jurisdiction
of this size that would be inappropriate and frankly I believe that the Integrity
Commission can only succeed if the community is confident that it does its business
without interference from politicians from any side of the fence.
By the same token when the Board of the Commission decides to establish an Integrity
Tribunal to inquire into a matter, as it will in the most serious cases, it
will do so without reference to the government of the day.
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I have spoken at some length about the principles behind this Bill. There are
two other matters of principle that I wish to touch on before concluding with
some more practical matters.
The first of these is retrospectivity. There has been quite a bit of debate
about whether the Integrity Commission should be able to deal with old allegations
or allegations about things that happened before it commenced operation.
Mr Speaker the Government takes the view that the Commission must be able to
look into these matters if it is to enjoy public confidence so there is no specific
cut off point imposed by the Bill.
We have to be realistic though and recognise that when the Commission opens
its doors there are going to be people wanting it to investigate allegations
which go back many years; allegations which have already been properly and thoroughly
investigated; and even some allegations which, quite honestly, were trivial
or malicious in the first place.
The Bill takes the approach of leaving it up to the Commission to decide which
matters to investigate but provides some guidance about the tests to be applied,
including public interest, in deciding whether to accept a complaint. These
tests will apply whether the complaint is about something that happened ten
years ago or ten minutes ago.
The final matter of principle relates to reputation. We all know the old saying
that wheres theres smoke theres fire but history also provides
plenty of examples where reputations have been damaged, sometimes irreparably,
on the basis of allegations which turn out to be without foundation.
This risk was discussed in a number of submissions to the Select Committee including
the submissions from Sir Max
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Bingham, from Professor Jeff Malpas and from the DPP, Tim Ellis SC.
Again it is a balancing act but the Bill deals with it by providing that the
bulk of the Commissions investigations will be conducted in private. There
is also provision to make the various notices issued by the Integrity Commission
confidential documents which can only be disclosed in specific circumstances.
It is only following the appointment of an Integrity Tribunal that allegations
will be explored in a public forum, normally presided over by the Chief Commissioner
who will be a person with legal qualifications and experience.
Despite the risk to reputation in those cases the Commission will have reached
the view that the gravity or public importance of the allegations warrants a
public hearing process.
In conclusion I note that the Budget for the Integrity Commission has been estimated
at around $2.5m per annum and an allocation of this order will be made in the
2010-11 State Budget. There will need to be more work to refine this figure
in coming months.
In the meantime the work of setting up the Integrity Commission will be able
to commence in earnest once the final shape of the legislation is known at the
end of the parliamentary debate. This work will incur significant expense and
needs to be the subject of supplementary funding in the current budget year.
The Governments expectation is that the Commission will not be in a position
to commence full operations before July 2010 but that the processes of recruiting
staff and establishing premises and systems will need to commence as soon as
possible to meet that deadline.
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Mr Speaker I commend the Integrity Commission Bill 2009 to the House.
FACT SHEET
INTEGRITY COMMISSION BILL 2009
The Bill implements the recommendations of the Joint Select Committee on Ethical
Conduct by establishing an Integrity Commission for Tasmania.
The Commission and its functions add to rather than replacing existing accountability
mechanisms and entities such as parliamentary committees and the Ombudsman and
Auditor-General who will be ex officio members of the board of the Commission.
The emphasis of the Integrity Commission will be on education and advisory services
to ensure that public sector institutions perform to the highest ethical standards.
The Integrity Commission will also be able to handle complaints of misconduct
in public authorities which are defined broadly to include Parliament, Ministers
and their offices, Government departments, businesses and companies, Tasmania
Police and councils and council owned companies.
A key feature of the Commissions operations will be the triage
of complaints. Once it has assessed a complaint the Commission can refer it
to another agency or process for investigation and action when that is appropriate.
The Integrity Commissions own investigative work will largely focus on
systemic misconduct and on allegations against senior and high profile public
officers such as MPs, heads of agency and chief executive officers, the Senior
Executive Service, aldermen and councillors and statutory office holders, and
allegations of serious misconduct by senior police officers.